Abstract-This paper presents the design of a P2P data persistent platform. Durable access and integrity of the data are ensured despite massive attacks. This platform, named DataCube, exploits the properties of cluster-based peer-to-peer substrates to implement a compound of full replication and rateless erasure codes. DataCube guarantees durable access and integrity of data despite adversarial attacks. In particular, the recovery of damaged data is achieved through the retrieval of coded blocks whose integrity is checked on the fly.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work we are interested in constructing a persistent storage functionality for implementing long-lived data objects despite massive and targeted attacks. Data redundancy is a required solution for implementing data persistence. However, in contrast to classic distributed systems in which the membership is stable, in peer-to-peer systems one has to face nodes churn (nodes propensity to frequently join and leave the system). To efficiently handle churn, recent works (e.g., [1] , [2] , [3] ) have extended classic DHT-based overlays (e.g., [4] , [5] , [6] ) to their clusterized version. Clusters are populated by nodes that are close to each other according to a given proximity metrics (i.e., logical, geographical or semantical), and each of these clusters acts as a vertex of the structured topology. All the join and leave events are handle at clusters level which largely limit their impact on the overlay topology. In addition to being robust to churn, one can easily take advantage of these clusters to guarantee durable access to data (by using nodes as replica) as long as the coverage of nodes failures assumptions is close to one. Unfortunately a fundamental issue faced by any practical open systems is the inevitable presence of malicious (a.k.a Byzantine) nodes [7] . They can devise complex strategies to prevent honest nodes or users from retrieving data they locally cache (e.g., by mounting eclipse attacks [7] ). Existing P2P overlays that focus on tolerating the presence of Byzantine nodes (e.g., [2] , [8] , [3] ) make the assumption that no more than a bounded proportion of malicious nodes (i.e., a third of the population) are present at any time and anywhere in the system. This is a fundamental and required assumption to be able to design Byzantine tolerant algorithms. However, differently from static distributed systems in which coverage of such an assumption is very high, in open systems, membership of the system evolves according to clients wishes. Thus even if the proportion of malicious nodes in these systems can be roughly estimated, there are some corners of the system that may be potentially surrounded by more malicious nodes than expected [9] . As a consequence, correctness of Byzantine tolerant algorithms cannot be ensured anymore, leading to the potential loss of integrity, or simply the non accessibility of the data that was cached at these nodes.
The solution we propose to face this challenging issue is by designing a hybrid redundancy schema (a compound of light replication and rateless erasure coding) on top of a clusterized DHT-based overlay. This schema guarantees durable access and integrity of data despite adversarial attacks. Briefly, in addition to replication at a subset of clusters nodes, data is fragmented, coded and spread outside its cluster. Each fragment is uniquely identified and is placed at the cluster that matches its new identifier. When a cluster is detected corrupted (through simple integrity tests), it is logically isolated from the system, and recovery of the data this cluster was in charge of is triggered. Fragments are collected, decoded, and the recovered data is eventually pushed to a new cluster that substitutes the corrupted one. A secure verification hashing scheme is used to identify and verify each collected fragment on the fly. Note that at the best of our knowledge this is the first work that addresses open systems data-persistence in presence of collusion.
In the remainder of this paper, Section II presents related work on persistent structured peer-to-peer systems. Section III discusses persistence issues that one has to face in presence of massive attacks. Section IV presents the design we suggest to solve that issue. Section V concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
Two main techniques have been proposed for handling data redundancy in large scale open systems: full replication (e.g., [5] and [10] ) and erasure coding (e.g., [8] ). Replication is based on creating copies of the original data object and placing these copies in distinct places in the system. The main benefits of using this scheme is clearly its ease of implementation and its very low download latency overhead. On the other hand, storage overhead incurred by the storing of full data object replicas and bandwidth needed to recreate new copies upon unpredictable join and leave of nodes tend to overwhelm the benefits of replication. Erasure coding provides redundancy without the overhead of replication. Specifically, an object is divided into k equal size fragments, and recoded into s coded symbols, with s > k . The ratio k s is called code rate and it gives the exact amount of redundancy added to the original data. Fundamental property of erasure coding is that the original data is recoverable from any k distinct coded blocks. Reed-Solomon codes are the pioneered fixed-rate erasure codes. They are well adapted to bounded-loss channels, and the recent introduction of Tornado codes guarantees fast coding and decoding operations (in linear time) however they are intrinsically not adapted to unbounded-loss channels (as generated coded blocks are interdependent). Rateless codes (also called Fountain codes) overcome this feature. As a class of erasure codes, they provide natural resilience to losses, and therefore are fully adapted to dynamic systems. By being rateless, they give rise to the generation of random, and potentially unlimited number of uniquely coded symbols. This makes content reconciliation useless and one may recover an initial object by collecting coded blocks generated by different sources. The three main rateless codes proposed so far are the pioneering LT codes introduced by Luby [11] , quickly followed by the online codes by Maymounkov et al. [12] and Raptor codes by Shokrollahi [13] . The two latest ones independently discovered the idea of adding a pre-coding phase to obtain linear codes and stronger recoverability guarantees. Section III-B details the main principles of online coding. An empirical study based on Kademlia [6] has shown that data redundancy management (full replication vs. erasure coding) strongly depends on both nodes availability and rate at which these changes take place. It has been shown [14] that erasure coding benefits vanish due to their implementation complexity and the increase in terms of download latency. The present work tends to demonstrate that by judiciously managing full replication and coding one can keep the best of both techniques.
From an operational point of view, an increasing number of peer-to-peers systems focus on implementing persistent objects. Total Recall [15] is designed to provide a probabilistic prediction of the number of replicas the system needs by evaluating the past behavior through a stochastic model. Differently from our approach Total Recall is not designed to handle a Byzantine-prone environment. In Reperasure [16] a fixed-rate erasure coding approach is performed to achieve redundancy. However, the lack of churn handling prevents nodes to find all required fragments. The closest work to ours in terms of failure model is OceanStore [8] . A primary/secondary-tiers of full replicas is employed to serialise objects read/write operations. In addition, an archival form of objects based on fixed-rate erasure-coding is massively applied to any object. Differently from DataCube, Oceanstore hybrid scheme does not handle adversarial collusion, and because of the use of fixedrate erasure codes, reliability of their data does not evolve with the number of replicated fragments. An unbounded number of full replicas are created according to the system latency and overload.
III. DATACUBE PRINCIPLES

A. Preliminaries
Prior to detailing our algorithm, we first present the two prerequisites any Byzantine tolerant cluster-based overlays have to provide to be directly exploitable by DataCube as a substrate: (i) each cluster must be uniquely labelled and, (ii) the size of each cluster must be lower (resp. upper) bounded. The lower bound, named S min in the following, should satisfy S min ≥ 4 to allow Byzantine tolerant agreement protocols to be run among these S min nodes. The upper bound, that we call S max , should be in O(logN ), where N is the current number of nodes in the system, to meet scalability requirements. Both prerequisites are already met (or easily achievable) in existing clusterbased overlays (e.g., in S-Chord [3] labels can be easily assigned as a function of nodes position on the Chord ring).
Let us briefly describe how cluster-based overlays typically evolve according to these properties. When node n enters the system, it joins the cluster whose label matches the proximity metrics. Once a cluster size exceeds S max , this cluster splits into two smallest clusters, each one populating with the nodes that are closer to each other. When n leaves, it simply leaves its cluster. When a cluster size reaches S min this cluster merges with its closest neighbour. According to the proposed overlays, all cluster members or only a subset of them (but at least S min of them) are in charge of routing lookup requests, replicating all data-items that match the cluster label, and handling cluster operations (split/merge and create). In the following we assume that only S min nodes are in charge of these operations. We call these nodes core members of a cluster. The other nodes of the cluster (if any) are inactive until they replace left core members. We call these nodes spare members of the cluster. In PeerCube [2] , spare members also allow to make join and leave events transparent to the overlay topology (this is simply achieved by having any node that joins a cluster to join it as a spare member). In the following, when referring to an action taken by a cluster, we mean an action taken by all the core members of that cluster. However, for simplicity of the presentation, we abusively use the term "cluster" in place of the terms "the core members of the cluster".
B. Principles of Online Coding
Online codes [12] are based on two main system parameters ε, and q. Parameter ε infers how many blocks are needed to recover the original message (i.e., a message of n blocks can with very probability be decoded from (1 + ε)n check blocks) while q affects the probability of reconstructing the original message (i.e., the decoding process may fail with negligeable probability (ε/2) q+1 ). Online coding consists in three phases respectively called pre-coding, coding and decoding phases. Consider an original message (or data item) divided into n equal-sized input blocks.
The pre-coding phase consists in generating a small number A = δεqn of auxiliary blocks, and by appending them to the original message. Specifically, for each original input block b i we associate q randomly chosen numbers i 1 , . . . , i q with i j ∈ [1, . . . , A] such that each auxiliary block a ij is computed by XOR-ing the content of all the input blocks we have associated it to. The A auxiliary blocks are then appended to the original n blocks message to form the so called composite message F of size n = n(1 + δεq) which is suitable for coding.
The coding phase consists in generating check blocks c i from the composite message F . Specifically, check block c i is generated by XOR-ing the content of d i blocks of the composite message, with d i a value sampled from a pre-specified probability distribution that depends on ε. The check block is then the pair c i , x i with x i the set of d i blocks adjacencies randomly chosen from F to compute the check block c i . A possibly infinite number of independent check blocks can be generated this way. Any set of (1+ε)n output check blocks are sufficient to recover a fraction 1 − ε/2 of the composite message.
Decoding amounts in rebuilding the bipartite graph composed by all recovered blocks c i , x i and its adjacencies x i . An adjacent block (also called neighbour) is a block in the set x i XOR-ed to produce each check block. In the bipartite graph the decoding algorithm continously looks for received check blocks with only one unknown adjacent block. It recovers the adjacent composite block by XOR-ing the check blocks and all adjacents. Hence, check blocks with adjacence-degree 1 are direct copies of the corresponding composite block. At each round, any recovered composite block increases the probability of recovering other blocks through its edges. At the same time input blocks are recovered from recovered composite blocks likewise.
IV. RESILIENT DATA STORAGE WITH RATELESS CODES
A. Leveraging the Power of Clustering
We now detail how DataCube guarantees a durable access to data-items. As previously mentioned in Section III-A, all core members of a cluster are responsible for the same dataitems. Thus as long as less than a third of core members are malicious, replication at core members is provably sufficient to guarantee both their persistence and integrity through Byzantine-tolerant agreements executed by core members. In particular any lookup request for any data-item D in the system is successful in no more than O(N/log 2 (N )) hops, and in O(log 2 (N ) messages (where N is the current number of nodes in the system) [2] , [3] . Now in presence of collusion, replication of data-items at core members does not guarantee anymore neither their persistence nor their integrity. Note that replicating data-items at all cluster members does not bring any additional guarantees. It will only take longer for the adversary to succeed in polluting the whole cluster. Thus the solution we propose is, in addition to keep full replica of data-items at core members, to fragment, identify, and spread check fragments at other clusters of the system, each fragment being placed at the cluster that matches the fragment random identifier. Hence, when a cluster is detected corrupted (through simple integrity tests), this cluster is logically isolated from the system, and recovery of the data this cluster was in charge of is triggered. Check fragments are collected, decoded, and the recovered data is eventually pushed to a new cluster that subsitutes the corrupted one. A secure verification hashing scheme is used to identify and verify each collected fragment on the fly. Thus if we consider data-item D such that D is originally placed on cluster C (C is the closest cluster to D key), then at cluster C, each core member stores a full replica of data-item D while each spare member of C stores check blocks c i , x i of data-item D such that C's label is closer to the key of c i , x i . Figure 1 shows the algorithm for the pre-coding and coding phases performed by any node p ∈ V c , the spreading of check blocks on the closest clusters to their keys, as well as the replication of check blocks at these clusters. Specifically, upon receipt of data-item D, node p proceeds as follows. It generates a composite message (as explained above) and its associated Merkle root [17] (see lines 1-6), and runs a Byzantine tolerant consensus agreement among core members to agree on a unique composite message and Merkle root (line 7). The Merkle hash tree is an authentication scheme based on a tree of hashes that eliminates the large storage requirement by using a single signature for authenticating a finite number of messages. The consensus agreement eliminates the possibility of using a corrupted composite message during the coding phase. Finally, the Merkle root guarantees that only consistent composite blocks are used during the decoding phase. Once an agreement is achieved, the coding phase is invoked by each core member.
In the Coding phase, c 0 = (1 + ε)n check blocks are initially generated (lines 9-17). Note that, more check blocks can be generated afterwards by invoking checkBlock function (lines 9-11). This invocation is triggered when all α spares, at which a specific check block is stored, collude together to alter the integrity of the check block. Function generatecheckBlock implements the generation of each check block according to Section III-B. To generate check blocks, core members use a PRNG function G(x) to select the degree of each check block, instead of using a random function, as described in [12] . Data-item key and the check block sequence form together the seed of G(x). The rationale of using G(x) is that it guarantees that all core members generate exactly the same check block at each coding round without any synchronization among them. At round j, the degree x j of check block c j , x j is derived from G(key (D) + j) .
Each check block is assigned a key from which the placement on Datacube is defined. Keys must be random (to prevent malicious nodes from devising strategies to generate them), but their retrieval, for decoding, must not involve any storage overhead. Indeed, a straightforward solution that would consist in storing the key of each generated check block in order to lately retrieve its associated check block would be clearly unbearable. Thus, Datacube exploits a hash-chain [18] method to identify check blocks. Each key assigned to a generated check block results from a recursive hash function on the data-item, establishing a chain (or stream) of keys. Specifically, given a data-item D and its associated key(D)=hash(D), then key cB n of check block c n , x n is equal to hash (n) (key(D)), with hash (n) (key(D)) the n th recursive application of the hash function on key(D). Upon invocation CodeBlock(key,cM sg,merkleRoot,b,c 0 ) do 9: if(cM sg = null ∨ merkleRoot = null) then 10:
cM sg ← key.getAgreedcMsg(); 11:
merkleRoot ← key.getAgreedMerkleRoot(); 12:
put(cB i , c i , x i , key) at α spare nodes of the closest cluster to cB i ; 16: enddo; 17: register(key,merkleRoot) at neighbour clusters of C if not already done; enddo;
p.spareView [i] .addCheck(cB i ,hash( c i , x i ),key); 23:
enddo; 24: else p broadcasts (STORE, (cB i , c i , x i )) to p's core set; enddo; Figure 1 . Algorithm performed by any core node p ∈ C Each check block c i , x i is then pushed at α ≥ 2 spare members (line 18) belonging to cluster C sec (line 15). We use the name C sec as a generic name for the closest cluster at which each check block is stored. These α spares are determined according to some arbitrary but deterministic function (e.g., the α spares are the closest spares to cB i ) (line 19). Replicating check blocks at α spares members reduces the influence of spare members departure, avoiding accordingly the computation cost of creating a new (Cb j , c j , x j ) block each time a spare member leaves. Whenever some replica q among α leaves or becomes manipulated, another spare member substitutes q. Then, the only situation during which a new check block (Cb j , c j , x j ) has to be generated is when all α spare members simultaneously leave or collude. Note that, when S max = S min (i.e., there are not enough spare members in the cluster) check blocks are temporarily stored at core members (line 25). Besides, by the time each check block is dispatched to α spares, core members of C sec compute and store a fingerprint of c j , x j by applying a one-way hash function on it (line 22). Afterwards, this fingerprint is used by cluster C sec to guarantee the integrity of check blocks stored at spare members.
Finally, to enable the recovery of data-items in case of corruption, each node p ∈ V c only needs to register the keys of all data-item D that are owned by p at the set of clusters C , such that C is a direct neighbour of C (see Section IV-C).
B. Detecting Attacked Clusters
The goal of the detection is to identify misbehaving clusters and tag these clusters as polluted to isolate them from the system. Practically, any cluster C that points to cluster B may verify B integrity upon receipt of a lookup request for some data-item D housed at B. When cluster C receives the response of the request it can easily check D integrity by checking that D hashing is equal to D key. In case of inconsistency, cluster C contacts all neighbours of B to agree on whether B is corrupted or not. In the affirmative the recovery process is invoked by the closest cluster pointing to B (see Section IV-C). Note that if the number of B neighbours is not sufficient to invoke a Byzantine tolerant agreement, then C relies on the closest cluster A to B to decide on B corruption. Finally, in case C (or equivalently A) is corrupted while B is not, then B is the only cluster that will consider B as attacked which is clearly not an issue since all the other neighbours of B will continue to send and receive data from B through other routes. Note that in DataCube spare members may store different check blocks under the same key. On doing so, any check block honestly created can never be masked by corrupted ones.
C. Recovering Attacked Clusters
Let C be the cluster that invokes the recovery of cluster B, and let D be the data-item initially owned by B. Then, any request r received by C that either (i) has B as an intermediate cluster on the path to its destination, or (ii) whose destination is B itself, is prevented from reaching cluster B as follows: in the former case, C forwards r to its recipient through another path, while in the latter case, C blocks request r, and takes in charge the recovery of D by aggregating sufficiently enough check blocks as now described. Cluster C has to collect sufficiently many check blocks (at least c 0 = n(1 + ε)(1 + δεq)) so that D recovery is guaranteed with probability 1−(ε) q+1 (see Section III-B). Specifically, let key(D) be the key corresponding to data-item D. From the hash-chain mechanism applied to key(D), C derives the keys of all the check blocks that are going to be collected, namely cB 1 . . . cB j , with cB j = H (j) (key(D)) and j = (1 + ε)n(1 + δεq), and from G(.) C generates x 1 . . . x j , the respective adjacencies of cB 1 . . . cB j . Finally cluster C sends a lookup request for all these check blocks. Upon receipt of a lookup(cB j ) request, core members ask for cB j to each of the α spare members that house it or them (as previously noted). By using check blocks fingerprints (and possibly with the means of majority votes), core members cope with spare members collusion by verifying the integrity of the retrieved check block(s). Finally, the integrity of the recovered composite blocks is also verified by using the associated Merkle root saved at the neighbour clusters during the coding process (see Figure 1 line 17) . It guarantees that only non-corrupted check blocks are used to recover the original data-item. In case of integrity violation, core members of cluster C ask for other check blocks (by invoking the CodeBlock function). Once data-item is fully decoded core members of C send it back to the requesting node, and temporarily store data-item D. This completes the recovery process.
When a new cluster N is created (due to a split, merge or create operation) and becomes in charge of the data-items of cluster B, recovered data-items temporarily stored in C are transferred to N . Further requests for dataitems previously owned by B (but not recovered by C) are recovered by N by proceeding as above.
V. CONCLUSION In this paper we have presented Datacube, a peer-topeer persistent storage architecture which provides data persistence. We have shown that through lightweight full replication and fountain codes, durable access to data-items is achievable despite of a powerful adaptive adversary and high churn. As future work, we intend to evaluate the performance of rateless codes as well as perform an in-depth evaluation of DataCube in terms of storage and bandwidth overhead, and data availability.
